

September 2, 2014

**Proposed Audit Procedures for Practices using Direct Record Electronic Voting Systems  
Pursuant to IC 3-12-3.5-8 Version b**

VSTOP has been tasked with recommending a procedure for use in cases of elections where the tally of votes cast differs by 5 or more from the number of voters who received ballots or returned absentee ballots in precincts using direct recording electronic voting system.

The following are guidelines for such an "audit":

**A. Pre-election and Election Day Guidelines:**

A number of measures can be taken to minimize occurrences of discrepancies in vote counts. These include the use of recording sheets that track various steps in the voting and reconciliation process. Each sheet should include signatures or initials of supervising authorities.

- Reporting sheets should provide complete information about each of the voting system units employed at the polling place. Information should include the serial number of the voting machine and the number of votes cast on each machine.
- Absentee reporting sheets should record serial numbers and machine counts used for absentee voting. These should be completed for both courthouse and satellite voting sites for each machine per precinct.
- Hourly or periodic tally updates during election day voting will facilitate reconciliation and can be useful in identifying the time of day when an anomaly might have been discovered or reported by a poll worker. Tally should never include actual election results or returns.
- Receiving Report on which the individuals at central count location verify that all memory cards and printed tally sheets have been returned from the polling location in appropriate envelopes.
- Verification and Uploading Report on which a bi-partisan team verifies that all memory cards for each unit at each polling location have been uploaded. After uploading is completed for each site, the memory cards are returned to the envelope and another bi-partisan team verifies that all tally cards have been returned to the envelope in which they were delivered. The completed envelopes are then marked and secured in a container until the final verification that all memory cards have been uploaded.

**B. Post-Election Guidelines:**

All documents and materials (paper and electronic) should be secured for further inspection and examination. The voting machines utilized at the polling location in question should be locked, tagged, and secured for possible inspection at a later time. If, for any precinct the total number of ballots cast and the number of voters who signed the poll book at the polls, or returned an

absentee or travelling board ballot, differs by five (5) or more, the County Election Board shall set a time and place to publicly inspect and review all election documentation for the precincts in question. The meeting should occur as soon after the election as possible since the audit period is limited to twelve (12) days at which time the County Election Board must certify the results of the audit to the Indiana Election Division. Public notice of the audit must be given (per section (g) of IC 3-12-3.5-8 version b) at least 48 hours in advance.

**County Election Board Procedures:**

1. Members of the election board gather and inspect records from all vote sources, including tally cards, tally print-outs and EMS printouts; absentee ballots; ballots from traveling boards; tally of voter signatures at check-in (if paper poll lists are utilized) or printouts from electronic poll books used for the precinct at voter check-in. It is recommended that this information be placed into a spreadsheet and accuracy checked by members of the election board.
2. The number of rejected and spoiled ballots (if any) should be tallied, recorded and placed into the spreadsheet if one is used.
3. The number of total ballots cast (V) should equal the number of voters who signed in and received a ballot on election day (ED) plus the number of voters who returned absentee (A) and travelling board ballots (T) minus the number of rejected and spoiled ballots (C). If  $V \neq (ED + A + T) - C$ , a discrepancy has been confirmed. Determine if discrepancy is 5 or more. If 5 or more, continue process.
4. Documentation secured at the polling place such as poll worker notes indicating problems or exceptions that occurred during the day should be consulted to determine if these additional factors explain when and how the discrepancy might have occurred. If the source of the discrepancy is discovered or the discrepancy is resolved, the Election Board shall proceed to step 6 below.
5. When the discrepancy remains unexplained, the County Election Board shall manually compute the vote totals for each contest and public question on the ballot from the printouts secured from each election machine added to the total number of absentee ballots plus traveling board ballots. These totals will then be compared to the totals produced from the Election Management System employed at the County Election office. If any discrepancies between the manual count and the electronic count for any contest or public question arise, these will be documented in the final report of the Election Board and the Election Board shall notify the Indiana Election Commission to determine if further investigation is warranted.
6. The County Election Board shall summarize its findings and report them with the certification of election results no later than 12 days after the election and file the results with the Indiana Election Division.