

2010 INDIANA INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE



Emergency Response is a Product of Preparedness

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100 km



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Recent Trends in Terrorist Attacks



The terrorist threat is continuously evolving, and even the most capably defended cities can be caught by surprise



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



Asymmetrical Warfare

“In a War on Terrorism, as in all wars, the more we know about our enemy, the better able we are to defeat that enemy”

- ★ Strategists define asymmetric warfare as conflict deviating from the norm, or an indirect approach to affect a counter-balancing of force.
- ★ Such warfare is not new
- ★ America’s adversaries and potential adversaries are turning to asymmetric strategies. We must therefore understand asymmetric warfare, and be able to respond in kind.

National Strategy for HLS



Recent Terrorist attacks –Has Posed First Responders with Diverse & more Complicated Communications Challenges & Putting them at more risk




- ✦ Istanbul 2003
- ✦ Madrid 2004
- ✦ London 2005
- ✦ Mumbai 2008
- ✦ Jakarta 2009



THE MUMBAI TERRORIST ATTACK

The next evolution of terrorism took place in Mumbai

- ❄ November 26th 2008, at least 10 terrorists infiltrated the City of Mumbai, India
- ❄ Staged a complex and well coordinated terrorist attacks that
- ❄ Killed over 195 people & wounded hundreds more.
- ❄ Over 18 Mumbai Police/Uniform law enforcement officers were targeted & killed



THE MUMBAI_TERRORIST_ATTACK TARGET LOCATIONS



NIGHT OF TERROR

November 26-27, 9.15 pm-1.43 am

Some 20 terrorists hijack a Gujarat-registered fishing vessel on the high seas, sail near Sassoon Dock and reach Gateway of India in dinghies. The men are young, dressed smartly in jeans and T-shirts, and lugging heavy backpacks. A few minutes on, they unleash mayhem in Mumbai.

THE ATTACKS

3 9.57 pm
A group of terrorists storm the Oberoi-Hotel at Nariman Point. They open fire indiscriminately with automatic weapons.

11 12.35 am
Terrorists take over Nariman House in Colaba, which is set up to many Israeli tourists. Earlier, they lob a grenade that misses a petrol pump but sends a panic nearby.

5 10.25 pm
Terrorists open fire in Colabaad.

1 9.15 pm
Firing at Café Leopold, popular tourist hangout.

4 10.03 pm
At the Taj Mahal Hotel near the Gateway of India, a handful of gunmen storm in from the front, spread out to the restaurants, open fire in the lobby. Some go up floors and keep ammunition and grenades on the domed roof of this more-than-a-century-old landmark.

2 9.21 pm
A group of terrorists strike at CST railway hoppers. They open fire indiscriminately, both on suburban and long-distance train platforms. In some versions, the first attack.

7 10.51 pm
Firing at BMC office.

8 10.59 pm
A group of terrorists threaten policemen at Azad Maidan police station, 100 m away from CST. They storm the Cama & Alibless Hospital.

6 10.50 pm
Firing at Times of India Building.

9 11.19 pm
Firing at Godalax Tejpal Hospital.

10 12.32 am
Firing at Vidhan Sabha, grenades hurled.

12 1.43 am
At Chowpatty on Marine Drive, police shoot dead two terrorists who had hijacked a police vehicle.

Death toll: 126
(including 18 police officers and 14 foreigners)

Injured: 327

THE BLASTS

- 1 Hotel Taj
- 2 Marine dock port colony
- 3 Oberoi Hotel
- 4 Colaba Market
- 5 Cama Hospital
- 6 Nariman Road
- 7 Hill Road
- 8 Free Press Road

Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus Train Station



Cama Hospital



Café Leopold



Nariman House



Oberoi Hotel



Taj Mahal Hotel



THE MUMBAI TERRORIST ATTACKS

- ★ The terrorists divided themselves into 4 attacks teams, one with 4 men and 3 with 2 men
- ★ Attacks were sequential and highly mobile
- ★ They targeted first responders with automatic weapons, grenades, and improvised explosive devices.
- ★ Multiple teams attacked several locations at once, combining armed assault, car jacking, drive by shootings, prefabricated ieds, target killings, policemen and selected foreigners, building takeovers, barricades and hostage situations.



THE FIRE BRIGADE & POLICE RESPONSE

First, the **continued assault**, combined with the **mobility of the terrorists**, required that **security zones be established** by Mumbai PD before firefighting and rescue operations could be initiated.



Second, numerous **IEDs** were planted throughout the city. It is believed that the **terrorists targeted the first responders** by placing IEDs near the **entrances and exits of the Tajand Oberoi Hotels**.



Armed with **AK-56 automatic rifles**, numerous magazines of ammunition, **9-mm pistols**, carried **8-10 hand grenades** each, **Improvised IEDs**, **high explosive RDX**, with ball bearings

They completely overpowered any lone patrol police encountered

THE FIRE BRIGADE & POLICE RESPONSE

Third, members of the fire brigade and PD were systematically targeted with small arms fire and grenades by the terrorists as they conducted rescue and firefighting & security operations.

This occurred both as the fire brigade rescued victims with portable and tower ladders, as well as while the inside teams were extinguishing the fires that the terrorist set to cover their movement.



THE FIRE BRIGADE & POLICE RESPONSE

★ Although they were severely challenged with respect to their operations, the fire brigade & police was still able to secure the area & rescue dozens of people throughout the three-day operation.



★ In the aftermath, however, they have requested bullet proof vests, bomb disposal training, and machinery that would allow tower ladders to be operated by remote control.



- Refined level of training, coordination
- Fired in controlled, disciplined bursts.
- Shots were fired in groups of three aimed at head level
- Experienced in working together as a unit
- Used hand signals to communicate across loud and crowded spaces

FIRST RESPONDER'S IMPLICATIONS

These recent terrorists attacks identified at least three broad challenge areas for emergency responders to consider following a terrorist attack

- Communications, both tactically and with the general public
- Establishing security and control over an incident site
- Effectively using emergency resources

FIRST RESPONDER'S IMPLICATIONS


TERRORIST COMMUNICATIONS & USE OF IT


- Attackers used cell phones, satellite phones, and carried Blackberries.
- They talked to media via cell phones to make demands, creating an image of hostage situation at certain locations, which further confounded PD tactical response.
- Called each other during siege, to discuss routes Called handlers, who exhorted them to continue the fight and received critical information from them watch TV giving them up to date information regarding doing of the PD,

Control information to the media and public to avoid rumors and panic

Prepare in dealing with telecommunications outages while responding to a crisis

Open and frequent communications between emergency responders





FIRST RESPONDER'S IMPLICATIONS



-Command-

- ☀ Command element should first determine if the event is terrorist in nature. If it is, determine if it's a singular or multiple event.
- ☀ Based on the type of event, the command element should then define the role of your Unified Command according to N.I.M.S.
- ☀ The task confronting first responders was very challenging in terms of logistical, organizational, and emotional tolls.
- ☀ Similar to the Istanbul bombings, emergency responders in Madrid were challenged by the simultaneity of the explosions and their geographic proximity to one another



FIRST RESPONDER'S IMPLICATIONS

-Control-


Access and control incident sites as soon as possible

Consider Sweeping for secondary devices

Protective gear before entering an uncleared site

Once the incident and the goals are defined, the command element should determine:

- Strategy:
 - Offensive / Defensive Operation
 - Life / Property
 - Risk / Reward
- Tactics:
 - Allocation of Resources
 - Shielding / Force Protection
 - Water Source



FIRST RESPONDER'S IMPLICATIONS

★ Emergency Resources

- Initial deployments of emergency responders and equipment appears to have been problematic at multiple sites.

- *FR Converged at the initial blasts/attacks.*

- Incident Commanders (ICs) did not have real time information and situational awareness at these events and initially did not know how many explosions/attacks had occurred and had difficulty receiving logistics regarding available resources.

- Police were eventually able to establish priority response & transport routes, but traffic immediately following the blasts made responding to the incident sites very difficult.



Keep emergency response personnel in reserve to deal with additional incidents

Emergency plans at hospitals to make bed space in emergency departments quickly available

Research Resources & Acknowledgements

---Lessons of Mumbai

Rand Corp

---Mumbai Attacks: What the NYPD learned from the attacks

January 16, 2009

---Mumbai Attacks Timeline and Order of Battle

Jedburgh Corp.

<http://jedburgh-usa.com/counter-terrorism-tactics-for-law-enforcement/>

---American Thinker

August 19, 2010

---9/11 Commission Report

Chapter 9: Heroism and Horror

Never Forget Your Mission

There is no higher priority than to continue to develop communication Interoperability



Thank You

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